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UNDERSTANDING EATING BOUNDARIES:
A STUDY OF VEGETARIAN IDENTITIES
Susan Kremmel
ABSTRACT
My research uses participants’ understandings to look at how people define and
use the identities and categories of “vegetarian” and “meat-eater.” My research examines
what it means to be vegetarian, how ideals and moral hierarchies are understood, and how
issues of identity importance, social support, and boundary work are components of
vegetarian identity construction processes.

My research highlights the unmarked

character of the meat-eating identity and investigates the variations and complexities of
eating behaviors and identities.

Learning more about how both vegetarians and meat-

eaters construct vegetarian identities contributes to our understanding of identities and
how, despite ambiguities, people experience identities.

I further previous work by

focusing more on the boundaries and interactions that become meaningful when
supporting ones identity.

Through one-on-one in-depth interviews, I draw out

perspectives and understandings of vegetarian and meat-eating meaning-making
processes.
This research demonstrates how, despite numerous variations within and between
groups, people develop more or less socially shared ideas of what it means to be
vegetarian, what vegetarian ideals are, and what moral meanings are produced by various
ii

eating behaviors.

These ideas run through issues of vegetarian identity, including:

identity importance, social support, and boundary work. Vegetarians and meat-eaters’
interactions involve cognitive processing, self-presentations, and negotiations that are not
as oppositional as stereotypical social ideas suggest. Meat-eaters play an active role
throughout many of these vegetarian identity construction processes and provide a more
balanced picture of them. Meat-eaters at times engage with vegetarians in the issues of
vegetarian ideals, moral hierarchies, identity importance, social support, and boundary
work.

iii

INTRODUCTION
Identity is about how people classify and evaluate themselves as a result of
ongoing socialization and interactional experiences.

Identity includes the meanings

attached to behaviors, experience, appearances, beliefs, and values.

Berger and

Luckmann (1966) argue that seemingly objective and opaque identities are the result of
behaviors that are constructed with conscious meaning, which become habitualized, taken
for granted, and finally learned by future generations as objective facts.

Hence,

understandings and negotiations reflect the constructed nature of the social world.
The construction of an identity reflects an ongoing dialogue that changes in
relation to political, religious, ethical, and ultimately social, ideas in specific contexts.
My particular interest is in eating identities, which are voluntary identities, as opposed to
relatively ascribed identities such as race and gender. In our current era, the inclination
to identify oneself as vegetarian is gaining popularity, in some populations doubling in
ten years (Beardsworth 1992; Willetts 1997). Stiles (1998) claims that in 1995 there
were between 8.5 and 12.4 million vegetarians in the United States and that the number is
reported to be increasing by 500,000 annually, making this identity increasingly relevant
for study. But how do vegetarians experience and construct identities revolving around
dietary choices? How do they attach meanings to behavior and develop and defend
boundaries?
To explore the constructions, meanings, and complexity of vegetarian identities, I
will draw from the work of Judith Howard (2000), who blends ideas from symbolic
1

interactionism and social cognition theory to provide a framework for examining identity.
This blend creates a perspective depicting identities as cognitive structures and resources
for interactional negotiations that are simultaneously stable and sensitive to social
context.
Howard (2000) writes that social cognition theory views human cognitive
capacities as limited and examines the way humans store and process information,
leading to the categorization of information in the social world in order to make life more
manageable.

These categorizations, organized into cognitive schemas, allow social

actors to summarize information and function more easily in the social world, but at the
expense of complexity. Howard argues that the categorizations are used to explain and
justify social relationships, creating identities that are rooted in their social contexts.
Social cognition theory includes understandings of in-groups (groups with which an
individual identifies) and out-groups (groups with which an individual does not identify)
as tools used to locate and support the value of particular social identities. According to
Howard, these cognitive processes are an important part of creating, maintaining, and
changing identities. My research will illustrate these cognitive processes at work in the
construction of dietary identities.
Howard (2000) further argues that symbolic interaction is a part of this process of
social cognition. Identities are defined as “strategic social constructions created through
interaction, with social and material consequences” (Howard 2000: 371).

Through

interaction, people attach symbolic meanings to objects, behaviors, selves, and others,
developing and spreading these meanings through interaction. In the case of dietary
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choice, attitudes and behavior surrounding food reflect the meanings attached to them,
which develop through the sum total of a person’s interactions in social life.
The identities resulting from interactions position people in social space based on
the relationships those identities entail (Howard 2000). Because of the interactional
nature of meanings, language is critical in constructing, negotiating, and communicating
identity.

Negotiations involve self-presentation or impression management through

“identity talk” (and more generally “identity work”), used to construct agreed upon
meanings and understandings of identities. Identity remains flexible as “people construct
and cross borders of various categories in defining themselves” (Howard 2000: 372).
Consistent with Howard, Eviatar Zerubavel (1991) argues that experiencing
identity involves engaging in behaviors that express and reinforce mental contrasts
between one person and others with whom that person comes into contact. He states that
“it is a pronouncedly mental scalpel that helps us carve discrete mental slices out of
reality […] segmenting it into discrete islands of meaning” (61-2). Certain beliefs,
thoughts, and behaviors are permitted or forbidden during identity construction, and the
very act of naming an identity involves the perception of boundaries and normative
outlines, creating “chunks of identity” (13). Zerubavel argues that through the social
process of “lumping” and “splitting,” constructed identities ignore similarities such as
those between diets and focus instead on the carved out differences. In lumping, items
are assigned similar meanings and grouped in a single mental cluster, while in splitting,
mental voids are introduced between items, which then are divided into different mental
clusters (21). This process in vegetarian identities highlights the differences between
meat-eaters and vegetarians and highlights the similarities within a group of vegetarians
3

or a group of meat-eaters.

Other differences and similarities are ignored.

These

processes of lumping and splitting reinforce a binary model for understanding these
eating identities, where vegetarianism becomes oppositional to meat-eating.
People’s interactions and meaning negotiations lead to perceived differences
between identity categories and similarities among those who “fit into” a given category,
the in-group. These categories may be used by individuals to make sense of their own
identity and experiences; a construction that highlights certain differences and similarities
while relegating others to the sidelines. People within the group of vegetarians actively
engage in boundary work to construct or maintain the definition of who does and does
not belong to that group. Food consumption choices are highlighted as one relevant
marker for engaging in boundary maintenance, while other characteristics are set aside,
especially in countries like the U.S., where meat is a central aspect of meals (Stiles 1998).
Identity salience is an important aspect of identity work. According to Stryker
and Serpe (1994), selves contain multiple aspects organized into a singular whole. These
multiple parts become subject to a hierarchy of salience whose location depends on the
prominence of the identity, its need for support, gratifications gained through performing
the identity, and perceived utility of the identity in a given situation. Stryker and Serpe
define identity salience as readiness to act out an identity as a result of the identity’s
cognitive schema, or stored meanings that serve as frameworks for interpreting
experience. They argue the relative salience of identities is “a function of commitment to
the roles to which the identities are attached” (19). Commitment is indicated by the costs
of no longer fulfilling an identity role, and costs are “a function of the strength of ties to
others in social networks, to which one relates by virtue of playing a role and having an
4

identity” (19). In my research, identity work depends on the relative salience of the
vegetarian identity in comparison to other identities, such as familial identities, that
become important in specific situations.
Yet vegetarian identities cannot be fully understood without also reflecting on the
“oppositional” meat-eating identities. While vegetarian identities are experienced as
salient and “marked” (Brekhus 1998), the meat-eating identities of the vast majority of
the U.S. population remain unnoticed. Brekhus labels identities like Anglo, heterosexual,
and meat-eating as “unmarked,” categories commonly considered “epistemologically
unproblematic.” Vegetarian identities are the “figure,” meat-eating identities are the
“ground,” the socially neutral category. People may experience meat-eating behavior as
natural rather than socially constructed due to the unmarked character of meat-eating
identities.
Additionally, Brekhus (1998: 36-37) critiques the way “distinctions within the
marked tend to be ignored, making it appear more homogeneous than the unmarked,”
while the marked are overly distinguished from the unmarked by representing the
category in its “most colorful, stereotypical images.” In line with Brekhus’ critique, my
research will focus on illustrating the high diversity experienced within the marked
vegetarian category as well as highlighting similarities between vegetarians and meateaters that often are ignored.

5

EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF EATING BEHAVIORS AND IDENTITIES
What have researchers learned about eating behaviors and identities?

Some

researchers argue there are relationships between eating behaviors and assemblages of
values, attitudes, and beliefs. For example, Dietz and his colleagues (1995) examine
factors influencing the choice of a vegetarian diet, with 14 people (7.2%) out of a 194
person sample claiming vegetarianism. While recognizing that this was a very small
number of vegetarians, these researchers argue that individuals with traditional values
(defined as honoring parents and elders, honesty, family security, self-discipline,
obedience, cleanliness, politeness, social order, loyalty) are less likely to be vegetarian.
Conversely, individuals holding altruistic values (defined as valuing unity with nature,
protecting the environment, preventing pollution, respecting the earth, a world at peace,
equality, social justice, helpful, a world of beauty, sense of belonging) are more likely to
be vegetarian. These researchers conclude that beliefs, attitudes, norms, and values are
predictors of dietary choice and that dietary choice is related to a sense of personal
identity. Kalof and her colleagues (1999) use the same “traditional” versus “altruistic”
value categories (and the same operationalizations) and have similar findings. Similarly,
Allen and his colleagues (2000: 410) found that a more salient meat-eating identity was
associated with “stronger social dominance orientation and right-wing authoritarianism,”
comprised of submission to recognized authority, aggression towards persons of lower
status, and conformity. Vegetarian identities were marked by a weaker association to
these orientations.
6

These studies link values, attitudes, and beliefs to food consumption choices,
creating vegetarian versus meat-eating “types of people” and in essence, creating moral
binaries with dichotomous understandings of the world. They indicate that vegetarianism
is an identity and that this identity matters.

Yet they do not approach identity

construction as a process to be explored. Rather, the existing research merely assumes
that the practice of eating or not eating meat is a salient and politically charged identity.
Previous research also has examined the motivations behind adopting a vegetarian
identity and how those motivations can change over time. Beardsworth and Keil’s (1992)
research in the United Kingdom argue that motivations to become and remain vegetarian
are mostly moral, with health-related, gustatory, and ecological motivations decreasing in
importance. This research also shows motivations for dietary preference change over
time. Beverly Stiles (1998) also studied vegetarians around the globe and reports similar
findings with the exception that health-related concerns ranked higher in her study.
Additionally, she argues that incorporating other vegetarian motives over time is
associated with a strengthening identity and often the strictness of maintaining a
vegetarian diet. New motives may become relevant to the person’s identity, increase
self-esteem, serve as a logical continuation of the identity, or represent increased
commitment and salience. It is noteworthy that while these questions have been asked
about vegetarians, researchers do not investigate why people eat meat, evidencing the
unmarked character of meat-eating behavior.
Researchers also have shown that there are variations in eating behaviors between
and within eating identity categories. Beardsworth and Keil (1992) find that people who
identify as vegetarian engage in eating practices that spread along a continuum of
7

strictness. From least strict to most strict these include red or white meat, fish, eggs,
dairy, rennet-free cheese, only vegetable derived products, and finally the prohibition of
the use of any animal derived products.

Additionally, Willetts (1997) finds that

vegetarians define and enact their identity to fit their individual lives, using justifications
to make sense of the ways that their behavior does not comply with socially understood
boundaries of the vegetarian identity. She reports that there are meat-eaters who eat less
meat than their vegetarian counterparts, illustrating how vegetarianism is a fluid and
permeable category. Indeed only 8 out of the 23 participants in her study who claim a
vegetarian identity do not eat meat “regularly” or “on occasion.” Others who claim a
vegetarian identity also say they prepare fish at home or buy chicken sometimes. This is
further evidence that vegetarian identity is not fully dependent on eating behaviors.
Likewise, Jabs and her colleagues (1999) report similar findings.

Individuals who

followed “vegetarian diets” modified the term to suit their own diet, and the researchers
conclude through measures of salience and pervasiveness that the diet does become an
identity.

Beardsworth and Keil, Willetts, and Jabs et. al.’s findings illustrate how

difficult it is to pinpoint specific requirements for claiming a vegetarian identity and
provide a mandate to further investigate the variations and complexities of eating
behaviors and identities.
Finally, prior research has examined whether these variations in eating behaviors
matter to other people in general. Using experiments to gauge vegetarians’ and meateaters’ responses to representations in profile stories, Hornsey and Jetten (2003) study
imposters as a source of group threat. Study respondents were given profile stories of
“imposters” (vegetarians who occasionally ate meat) and “authentic vegetarians” (who
8

did not eat meat at all). These researchers found that those who identify more strongly as
vegetarian are more likely to decrease their affinity for the imposter profile than the
authentic profile. Moderate vegetarian identifiers are more accepting, yet still show more
affinity for the authentic profile, and meat-eaters are more accepting of the imposter
profile than the authentic profile.

Additionally, profiles depicting vegetarians

occasionally eating meat and trying to hide their non-normative behavior produce even
lower levels of affinity from strong vegetarian identifiers and more accepting levels from
moderate vegetarian identifiers or meat-eaters.
Hornsey and Jetten (2003) argue that imposters are judged negatively because
they pose a threat to a valued vegetarian identity by breaking the norms of that identity,
thereby delegitimizing it. They suggest that decreased affinity results partly from the fear
that imposters will decrease the group’s distinctiveness or undermine the integrity of the
group’s moral position. If so, it seems that vegetarians engage in a process of lumping
and splitting in order to maintain socially understood vegetarian boundaries and moral
hierarchies (Zerubavel 1991).

This raises a question that cannot be examined in

laboratory settings: Do vegetarians and meat-eaters work to maintain eating boundaries?
Willetts (1997) finds more complexity in how much these variations might
actually matter. She reports that vegetarians who eat meat justify their behaviors as
unpremeditated occasions in order to prevent social awkwardness and keep from spoiling
their vegetarian identity suggesting recognition and reproduction of the norms
surrounding a vegetarian identity (see also Stiles 1998; Jabs et. al. 1999). Justifications
indicate that variations in eating behaviors matter to both the people engaging in the
behavior and others and must be accounted for. Despite these justifications, vegetarians
9

in Willetts’ study, unlike those in Hornsey and Jetten (2003) and Beardsworth and Keil
(1992), tend to accept other vegetarians’ definitions and consumption choices without
morally evaluating them. Non-vegetarian participants, however, draw attention to what
they perceive to be vegetarian hypocrisies, inconsistent with Hornsey and Jetten. The
importance meat-eaters place on perceived identity hypocrisies suggests that meat-eaters
may view some vegetarians to be claiming a moral superiority they do not deserve.
Differences in the extent to which variations in eating behavior matters to people reflects
social stratification and moral hierarchies within the vegetarian spectrum, those
consuming fewer animal products being closer to an “authentic” vegetarian. They also
suggest, however, that there are other complexities involved in these evaluations.
These studies provide a foundation for examining the socially constructed
understandings of vegetarian boundaries and identities. They demonstrate how values,
attitudes, beliefs, and motivations can be attached to eating behaviors. They show there
are variations in eating behaviors both within and between categories as well as
variations in responses to these behaviors. To better appreciate how both vegetarians and
meat-eaters define and maintain meanings and identity boundaries through cognitive
processes of lumping and splitting, my research will move the prior work forward by
approaching identity construction as a process to be explored. My research examines
what it means to be vegetarian, how ideals and moral hierarchies are understood, and how
issues of identity importance, social support, and boundary work are components of
vegetarian identity construction processes. My research will highlight the unmarked
character of the meat-eating identity and further investigate the variations and
complexities of eating behaviors and identities.
10

Learning more about how both

vegetarians and meat-eaters construct vegetarian identities contributes to our
understanding of identities and how, despite ambiguities, people experience identities.

11

METHODS
Because my questions are about sense making processes, I conducted one-on-one
in-depth interviews. This approach allowed me to explore complex perspectives and
understandings of vegetarian and meat-eater meaning-making processes. My participants
included 8 self-identified vegetarians and 10 self-identified meat-eaters. While I use the
general terms “meat-eater” and “vegetarian” in my analysis for economy of expression,
the data indicate that the terms “vegetarian” and “meat-eater” do not fully illustrate the
range of dietary self-identifications and were not accepted without some kind of
modification by the majority of participants.
Meat-eaters included one person identifying himself as a meat-eater (eats mostly
meat and starches and very few vegetables), one ex-vegetarian (has been a fish-eating
vegetarian but is now consuming poultry and mammals again), and eight omnivores (eat
a “balanced” mix of meats, starches, and vegetables). Vegetarians included one strict
vegetarian/freegan (eats no fish, poultry, mammals; only eats dairy or eggs if they
constitute 5% or less of the ingredients, especially if the food is free or going to be
otherwise thrown away), one vegan/vegetarian (believes that vegan and vegetarian denote
the same behavior, eats no poultry, fish, mammals, dairy, or eggs), two vegans (eats no
poultry, fish, mammals, dairy, or eggs; no purchasing of other goods with animal
products in them), and four vegetarians (eats no poultry, fish, or mammals).
Because there is no exhaustive list of the vegetarian population, participants were
recruited using a snowball technique. I started by interviewing two vegetarians and two
12

meat-eaters and then tapped into their network of acquaintances. I asked each initial
participant to contact two vegetarians and two meat-eaters, and after gaining their
friends’ permission, to provide me with those acquaintances’ contact information. I
continued this process and interviewed participants until their stories ceased to introduce
new understandings or insights.
All of the participants were 18-25 year old students in a large Southeast U.S.
university. Because college students are one group increasingly adopting vegetarian
identities (Beardsworth and Keil 1992), this is an appropriate sample.

Among the

vegetarians, eight are Anglo (all from the U.S. except one who is from Russia); six are
female and two are male. Among the meat-eaters, eight are Anglo, one is Indian, and one
is Asian; seven are male and three are female. These demographics are consistent with
research showing women are more likely to be vegetarian than men (Worsley and
Skrzypiec 1998). The relatively racially/ethnically homogenous makeup of the sample
likely is a result of participation selection biases.
This sample does not draw from older populations of vegetarians and meat-eaters
or from populations with limited formal education. Given the sample by referral, these
people might be more likely than others to experience vegetarianism as an important
identity and to have a network of social relationships around their identity.

While

limiting the possibilities of generalizing study findings, these likely characteristics are
good for my purpose of examining how vegetarians negotiate boundaries.

People

without important vegetarian identities or communities arguably do not spend much time
negotiating the boundaries of that identity. Additionally, the nature of this sampling
technique creates bias because the participants selected the other vegetarians and meat13

eaters in the sample. This means that they chose friends they perceived to be vegetarian,
perhaps overrepresenting the vegetarian types who are more noticeable in interactions or
marking what the referring participant perceived to be a representative or “good”
vegetarian. Yet again, while limiting the possibilities of generalizing study findings,
these biases mean only that study participants were likely to have socially important
vegetarian identities.
I started the interviews by asking general questions about the participants’ beliefs
and feelings about food, what they chose to eat or not eat. I allowed them to supply their
own dietary labels. I asked questions about how the participants described themselves to
others, whether their diet was an important part of how they thought of themselves, and
whether they engaged in activities (aside from eating or not eating certain things) that
related to their dietary identities.
Later in the interviews I asked vegetarians questions about what it was like to
become vegetarian, if they think there are different types of vegetarians, if they have
experienced situations where it was difficult to maintain their diet, and if they have
encountered situations where they compromised their dietary beliefs and preferences. To
elicit stories about interactions, I asked them to talk about some of their vegetarian and
meat-eating friends, family, and partners. Finally I asked questions about what they
thought about other people’s dietary beliefs, whether they have ever challenged or
wanted to challenge other people’s ideas or behavior, and whether they worried about
how others evaluated their dietary choices.
I attempted to ask meat-eaters similar questions, but many of these questions did
not make sense to them. This was especially true for questions about the importance of
14

their diet and the problems they experience in maintaining their diet. The very process
of interviewing vegetarians and meat-eaters demonstrated the consequences of marked
versus unmarked identities. While meat-eaters are not the focus of this study, their
interview contributions are used to enrich analysis of the social ideals of vegetarianism,
understandings of moral hierarchies, identity importance, and boundary work. They
supplement vegetarian understandings and illustrate the widespread character of certain
understandings.

15

DEFINING MEANINGS
This research examines how vegetarians and meat-eaters define and maintain
meanings and identity boundaries, how ideals and moral hierarchies are understood, and
how issues of identity importance, social support, and boundary work influence
vegetarian identity construction processes.

The specific content of various eating

identities must first be examined in order to explore what people mean when they
categorize themselves into one or another identity.

Defining Eating Boundaries
Though I cannot define what it means to be a vegetarian, vegan, omnivore, or
meat-eater, both participants and I use these labels throughout the study. In general, a
vegetarian is one who does not eat meat, a vegan is one who does not eat any animal
products and often does not use manufactured goods containing animal products, and an
omnivore/meat-eater (all but one respondent distance themselves from the term “meateater”) is one who eats both meat and vegetables. Though in common conversation
people tend to stick to the terms vegetarian or not (they do not usually call someone a
meat-eater or omnivore), people do differentiate nominally, behaviorally, and
attitudinally between people’s dietary practices.
People use a variety of labels and have a variety of understandings about the
meanings and contents of eating identity labels. Some vegetarians, for example, claim
that how people choose to enact vegetarianism is all personal, but other vegetarians have
16

very strict understandings, saying, “I guess if you only eat meat very, very, rarely—no,
that’s still not vegetarian.”
For other vegetarians, the use of “basic” vegetarian labels is not important. One
vegetarian claims that “there isn’t a difference between vegetarian and vegan. […] I mean
the labels are fine but I don’t think we should rely so heavily on what they are.” Yet I
accidentally asked a person in one interview who self-identified as vegan what the
hardest part of being vegetarian was, and he was quick to reply, “I’m not vegetarian, I’m
vegan.”

Such statements indicate the salience and distinctions many self-identified

vegans experience between the vegan label they claim and the vegetarian label from
which they distance themselves. Perhaps the strict behaviors they engage in to maintain
their diet makes such distinctions very important.
Cultural typologies employ terms such as “ovo-vegetarian” and “lacto-vegetarian”
to describe vegetarians who may consume eggs or dairy. Vegetarians, while recognizing
these typologies, often do not endorse them. One woman who calls herself a vegetarian
states:
Pesco-vegetarian- that can be different because that is fish, so a lot of
people don’t consider that vegetarian. So pesco-vegetarians are fine, but
the ovo and lacto, it’s just sort of repetitive because you know, I assume
vegetarian, you’re going to eat at least some form of dairy or egg, or else
you would call yourself vegan.
This woman believes that certain behaviors are distinct enough to warrant different
labels. Pesco-vegetarian is different enough from vegetarian to be given a label, likewise,
vegetarian is different enough from vegan.
17

Her understanding of the validity of

categorization comes from what “a lot” of people agree on and an assumption that the
labels are known and properly used.

Yet despite such general understandings, other

study participants do not classify consuming dairy and eggs as vegetarian. One selflabeled vegetarian for example, says, “I don’t consider consuming dairy and eggs
vegetarian [but] I wouldn’t go against it, since that is what the norm is.”
Even meat-eaters seem to orient to such understandings of eating boundaries.
One meat-eater believes:
There are vegetarians who will absolutely forego anything that comes
from an animal, whether it be vegan or something different. There are
people who will eat dairy, milk, eggs, whatever. Then there are people
who will occasionally eat flesh, will eat animals. They’ll have fish or
chicken now and then. […] it’s not well labeled, as far as I’m concerned.
Most participants are aware of the vast array of eating behaviors that vegetarians engage
in and many also express confusion in the precise labels for these boundaries.
While there are many variations in boundaries and terminology, “meat” is an
important aspect of all of them. By definition, a vegetarian is a person who does not eat
“meat.” But what is “meat?” Both vegetarians and meat-eaters can disagree about what
constitutes meat, and those who eat meat make further distinctions about what constitutes
“edible” meat.

Study respondents speak of what they term “normal” or “average”

understandings of meat but have or adhere to alternate understandings, including the
conception of mammalian flesh as the only “real” meat. One meat-eater states:
Meat is from mammals, therefore from birds, it’s poultry, and from fish,
it’s fish, and such. […] meat has two meanings.
18

I mean if you’re

classifying it in terms of where it came from, I guess it has a general
meaning, the muscle/fat/skin on any kind of animal.
Other vegetarians and meat-eaters reject such differentiations, saying things like, “If you
don’t want to eat meat, but then you say, ‘well this isn’t really meat, it’s fish.’ […] it just
sounds sort of screwy.” Similarly, other participants tell stories about religious texts and
food pyramid placements being used as justifications for alternative conceptions of meat
and talk about the disagreements that can arise.
People also differentiate between a general definition of meat and a definition of
meat based on evocative cultural understandings. One meat-eater states:
I think meat in a general sense, would have to be all encompassing of the
animal kingdom. When I think of meat, I think of red meat, steak, burger.
When someone says meat, I think of beef, I don’t necessary think salmon
or snails, I wouldn’t consider that meat.

Meat carries such a heavy

undertone, like meat just sounds thick, juicy, red. To me at least. It’s not
like chicken fingers or something, which is meat and an animal… I think
when you’re actually describing meat, people think of beef…
His construction of meat as heavy, juicy, and red is very sensual and reflects a
widespread cultural understanding that may affect people’s food choices, leading people
to adopt a vegetarian lifestyle only involving an exclusion of red meat, which is a
common teenage definition of vegetarianism in Australia (Worsley and Skrzypiec 1998).
Meat-eaters make further distinctions about what constitutes “edible” meat.
While a couple of meat-eaters express no problem with eating any kind of animal flesh,
most do make distinctions. One meat-eater states:
19

I think the beef I eat, I’m not sure where on the cow it comes from, but
when they start naming specific things, like, you’re kind of weird about it.
[…] maybe it really has to do with I just couldn’t pretend I wasn’t eating
an animal.
Meat-eaters may avoid eating meats that remind them of the animal. Other meat-eaters
make further distinctions, claiming, “I’m not such a fan of looking at uncooked meat […]
I think uncooked meat reminds me that it was once a living creature.” Still other meateaters make distinctions between pets and edible meat, saying, “I’ve had five dogs my
entire life, so I’d feel really weird about eating a dog.” The distinctions go on. Though
they admit other animals and other parts of animals constitute meat, they make
distinctions between that and the meat they are willing to consume.
Such inconsistencies and distinctions run throughout interview data and provide
illustrations of the range existing within the seemingly simple categories of “vegetarian”
and “meat-eating.”

The question therefore becomes: how can vegetarianism be an

identity given all these variations? Eating boundaries are very fuzzy, yet somehow,
despite the acknowledged ambiguity, participants still claim vegetarian labels and
experience vegetarian identities. Those identities are real to those who experience them.

Defining Ideals
Despite variations, there is an ideal of “vegetarianism,” and people orient their
understandings and evaluations toward this ideal. Social ideals of “the vegetarian” exist
in lay discourse and they make sense since identity involves the perception of boundaries
and normative outlines. A woman who calls herself a vegetarian says:
20

I don’t think I am a poster child. Somebody who would never slip, never
revert to eating meat. Somebody who knows a lot about it, who’s done
their research, who is able to sustain a really healthy diet […] who’s going
out and doing something about it.
According to her, the social ideal for a vegetarian identity involves never crossing dietary
boundaries, being well-informed, healthy, and socially/politically active. This ideal is
noted by both vegetarians and meat-eaters. Meat-eaters for example, say things such as,
“There’s a certain mantle to go with vegetarianism […] very activist, very political, very
motivated.” Both vegetarians and meat-eaters show an understanding of these vegetarian
ideals. Though many of the vegetarian participants do not consider themselves socially
or politically active, they nonetheless believe such an ideal exists. Moreover, the ideal of
never crossing dietary boundaries is mentioned by all participants.
For some vegetarians, the ideal is very strict. They state, “A true vegetarian
would not eat animal products at all. Just because you didn’t have to kill the animal and
cut it up doesn’t mean it’s any less cruel.” In this sense, the ideal vegetarian does no
harm to animals. To some extent this representation may be reinforced by stereotypical
images in media and other venues, images that are treated as representative when they
connect to marked categories (Brekhus 1998: 37).
Though the social ideal of the vegetarian exists, vegetarianism in practice is not so
clear. Real-life interactions often do not seem to fit vegetarian ideals. Some vegetarians
recognize these symbolic moments and highlight practicality as an important concept for
understanding them:
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Rubber is made from animals a lot of times and oil and make-up and
almost everything. And the plants and things that we’re eating, they kill
thousands of insects and rodents and things like that in trying to keep their
crops growing […] you can’t live a 100% vegan life.
This woman believes rigid and ideal understandings of vegetarian identity boundaries are
impractical ways of living. She notes that vegetarians live in larger cultures that often do
not operate in line with vegan/vegetarian beliefs.

Yet despite these difficulties,

vegetarians often orient themselves toward the ideal vegetarian. Though just over half of
the vegetarian participants identified the importance of social or political activism to
vegetarianism, they all orient themselves toward maintaining boundary consistent eating
behavior.
Though consuming dairy and eggs is widely accepted as normal behavior for
vegetarians, many vegetarians orient toward the ideal of consuming as little of these as
possible. One vegetarian states, “I’m feeling kind of uneasy about milk products because
it supports the veal industry so I don’t know if I will make the jump to vegan eventually.”
She perceives that she is not the ideal and aspires to move closer to it.
Other participants show an understanding of the ideal vegetarian by distancing
their own behavior from the ideal. One vegetarian states, “For a while I called myself
vegetarian and ate fish, dairy, and eggs. I think someone might have asked about it and I
said, ‘I’m vegetarian, but I eat fish, too.’” This vegetarian’s use of the term “but”
indicates that, while fish-eating vegetarians can be counted, eating fish is not considered
a characteristic behavior and does not fit the ideal. While he may not have had a problem
with eating fish at the time, he still believes the social ideal that vegetarians do not eat
22

fish. Likewise, many other participants either are or know people who eat fish and claim
a vegetarian label, and likewise indicate an orientation toward, yet a distance from, the
ideal.

Defining Moral Hierarchies
Despite the understanding that strict diets are hard to maintain in practice, the
existence of ideals and orientations toward them lead to constructions of moral
hierarchies. Where boundaries lie and how much people care about them vary, but
participants do believe that some boundaries are more socially desirable than others.
While a couple of vegetarians claim, “I don’t think it’s right to say one thing is better
[…] it’s all a personal choice,” others, like the one below, state:
I guess [being vegan] would be considered better […] what one person is
happy with, you know, this is as high as they’re going to go with this
issue, so you know, they’re only going to be vegetarian and another one
can push on to a higher level of vegetarianism and say, “Yeah, veganism.
That’s where it is for me.”
This account indicates the ideal in terms of height. The higher you are, the closer you are
to the ideal, which is morally better. Additionally, some vegetarians claimed they feel
morally superior to meat-eaters and that “vegetarian kids and vegan kids are a lot more
compassionate and understanding in general than other people.” Moreover, this moral
hierarchy exists even within vegetarian identities. One of the two self-identified vegans I
interviewed claims vegetarianism is good, “just not as good as vegan.”
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Even meat-eaters subscribe to moral hierarchies. Many meat-eaters talk of moral
discomfort when comparing their position to that of vegetarians.

One meat-eater

confesses, “It just makes me feel a little bit inferior that I’m not taking a holier ground
sometimes. I think I feel that vegetarianism is morally superior.”
When people call themselves vegetarian while they occasionally eat meat, their
position in the moral hierarchy falls. This belief is shared by vegetarians and meat-eaters
alike.

Some vegetarians feel the moral implications of their vegetarian identity in

interactions with what they perceive to be “better” vegetarians. For example, one woman
says:
When I relapsed, I didn’t tell [my friends who are vegetarian]. They’re
very invested in it, so there I never say. There, when you come over,
everybody cooks vegetarian and assumes everyone is vegetarian. […]
when I first met them I was just starting being a veggie, and I was very
proud of that fact. So it would be like admitting some sort of relapse of
addiction.
This woman says she is very proud of becoming vegetarian, indicating an experienced
morality.

Then, when she “relapsed,” she experienced the decreased morality of a

potentially spoiled identity and was aware of her less than ideal position. Comparing her
feelings to “admitting some sort of relapse” suggests not only a personal negative
evaluation, but the fear of others’ perceptions of her identity as less moral. Similarly, one
meat-eater states:
If they’re going to have the audacity to call themselves one thing and do
something else to make ourselves feel better as meat-eaters and
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omnivores, we have to call them out on it. That would be like someone
who completely foregoes alcohol and has a drink now and then. We as
people who drink often have to call them out on that to make ourselves
feel better. […] Just to bring them down from a loftier stance, I guess.
This meat-eater, like many others I interviewed, believes it is unacceptable to call
yourself a vegetarian yet occasionally eat meat. Such people need to be brought “down”
from their lofty position in the moral hierarchy. Interestingly enough, these findings are
inconsistent with Hornsey and Jetten (2003), whose data indicate that meat-eaters are
more accepting of vegetarian “imposters” who eat meat occasionally. They are, however,
consistent with Willetts’ (1997) findings, which show that meat-eaters are critical of
inconsistent behavior among vegetarians due to a perception that they are claiming a false
moral position.
These data illustrate that while vegetarian identities are typically treated as
marked categories, closer inspection reveals the variety existing within unmarked
categories. Nevertheless data show that vegetarians and meat-eaters alike can develop
coherent ideals and moral hierarchies and interact in regards to them. These ideals and
hierarchies are used to create vegetarian identities and boundaries.

25

DEFINING IDENTITY BOUNDARIES
How do people use these variations, ideals, and moral hierarchies to maintain
identities? This section examines how vegetarians’ experiences in the social world
encourage them to experience their eating behavior as a salient and important identity.
Their non-normative behavior gives them a minority status in society that they are
constantly reminded of, creating an identity of both their own and others’ making that is
maintained through boundary work.

Identity Importance
Holding vegetarian beliefs and behaviors constitutes an identity for most
vegetarian participants in this study. While a few people claim this identity is not very
important, even they provide evidence that vegetarianism entails the salience and
commitment that is characteristic of identities in general:
Yeah, I don’t think I could ever eat meat again. It’s important part of
how I think about myself. […] I almost never think about it […] other
people bring it up a lot. If I’m in a group of people and they’re like,
“Oh, let’s go to Burger King,” they’ll be like, “No, Virginia’s a
vegetarian,” you know, like it’s a big deal.
This vegetarian tells a conflicting story where her identity simultaneously is something
she “almost never” thinks about, while it’s a “big deal” to her friends. In her case the
identity is very salient in social contexts, and one aspect of her identity involves being
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constantly reminded of it by others. Vegetarianism may be a part of ones identity that is
more salient to the non-vegetarian other. One meat-eater, for instance, when asked what
proportion of her friends were vegetarian, initially reported 50%. After telling some
stories, she amends, “I change that 50% honestly, it’s more like 10%. It just seems like a
larger percentage.” The fact that being vegetarian is not the social norm may make
interactions with vegetarians more salient and memorable.
Other vegetarians say that being vegetarian is “not a big deal” but provide
evidence that non-vegetarians would see as a good indicator of identity, including:
posting to vegetarian forums, attending vegetarian conferences, being involved with
animal rights groups, trading recipes, and so on. There is a distinct vegetarian subculture
in which many vegetarian participants are involved, indicating the salience of their
vegetarian diet.

It seems that identity for vegetarians simultaneously involves

experiencing socially non-normative behavior as normal for them, and also being made
aware of the ways they are different from others in social settings.
In contrast, meat-eaters typically do not experience their dietary practices as a
salient identity, saying things like, “It almost never comes up between two omnivores
talking to each other” and “it’s a mainstream line of thinking and generally the
mainstream line of thinking hardly ever has to be defended.” When I interviewed people
who ate meat, my questions about times when this eating identity mattered did not make
sense. They typically did not understand why they might experience a lack of social
support for their identity, why eating meat might come up as an issue during social
events, or what being a meat-eater even meant to them. Meat-eating was just “normal.”
This is the practical meaning of an unmarked identity (Brekhus 1998).
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However, in interactions with vegetarians, the unmarked character of meat-eating
becomes marked and important for making distinctions between two or more social
actors. One meat-eater reports, “One time I went to the cafeteria with a bunch of my
friends […] and I was the only meat-eater […] whenever I’m around vegetarians I felt
self-conscious about eating meat.”

When the tables are turned, when the situation

involves a meat-eater surrounded by vegetarians rather than a vegetarian surrounded by
meat-eaters, meat-eating identities become salient.

They are the marked identity.

Vegetarians may feel self-conscious if they are a minority in dining situations, but this is
a common experience for them. Arguably, because meat-eaters so rarely experience their
dietary practices as a marked category, it is very salient when they do. This experience
can be very uncomfortable when there is a perceived moral evaluation attached to it,
producing heightened feelings of self-consciousness. Intriguingly, this account shows
how even meat-eaters may experience their position as an orientation toward the
vegetarian ideal, though not very close.
In addition to experiencing salience, vegetarians believe that maintaining
vegetarian behaviors are extremely important. One vegetarian declares, “If I was starving
in the desert and all I could eat was meat, I’d probably eat the meat,” and that was his
only concession. He and a couple of others would choose to go hungry for a few meals
rather than compromise their beliefs. To them, the strength of their belief is more
important than hunger and, arguably, social politeness in dining situations.
Other vegetarians, however, perceive good, or at least acceptable, reasons to eat
meat. They eat meat when they are drunk, celebrating, very hungry, or exhausted. One
vegetarian admits that in an earlier stage of her life, “I was vegetarian/vegan except on
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Thanksgiving.

We would have turkey on Thanksgiving,” and others share similar

experiences. In the numerous cases where vegetarians recognized boundaries of their
identities, the physical act of consuming animal flesh or products is given different
meanings based on their definition of the situation.
This sweet old lady who speaks English but not that great and has no idea
what veganism is, she tried. And you know, she didn’t cook meat, she
cooked a variety of things so I could eat, but the sauce, which of course is
mixed in with everything, has the tiniest bits of little meat mixed in all
over with everything.

I was just like, “I cannot be this rude to this

woman.”
This vegetarian eats the sauce because she believes that politeness is more important than
maintaining eating behaviors consistent with her vegetarian identity. These data are
consistent with Willetts’ (1997) findings that many vegetarians believe avoiding social
awkwardness is a justification for eating meat that does not spoil their vegetarian identity.
Vegetarians who tell stories like this will cross boundaries to avoid offending someone
who has worked hard and attempted to accommodate them, even when these others get it
wrong. These vegetarians engage in emotion management, prioritizing the emotional
comfort of others at the expense of dietary beliefs (Hochschild 1983). I suggest this
interaction simultaneously serves to manage the vegetarian’s own emotions by creating a
situation where the vegetarian does not have to experience the embarrassment or guilt
that often accompanies being rude to a “sweet old lady.”
Other vegetarians see their dietary beliefs as less important, partially due to the
lack of social importance attached to the identity. One vegetarian talks about times when
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she wonders whether the soup she orders has chicken broth in it, saying, “I sometimes
think about telling people I’m allergic if I’m going to do something like that. I don’t feel
like I have enough of an excuse to cause a scene.” This vegetarian is very conscious of
her potential to irritate restaurant workers. Preventing awkwardness again is described as
more important than dietary beliefs, and she defines her vegetarian beliefs as not a good
enough “excuse.”

She contrasts her “illegitimate” situation with the “legitimate”

situation of allergies. Her perception of vegetarianism as a less valid excuse indicates
perceptions of it as a socially less important position. The relative social importance of
an identity may affect experiences of the personal importance of the identity. This
woman’s comment suggests that she is aware that restaurant workers would be more
responsive and accepting of a person they perceived as unable to consume certain
products, as opposed to a person they may perceive as irritating and picky, reflecting a
perceived lack of social legitimacy attached to vegetarian identities.
The importance of dietary behavior for some vegetarians who have very strict
beliefs goes further than simply not consuming meat or dairy. These vegetarians must
often make decisions about issues they commonly call “contamination.” These are
instances where meat or dairy may have been in contact with the food they wish to eat, or
where foods contain hidden animal product ingredients. According to one vegetarian:
If I get a sandwich somewhere and people are wearing gloves that have
been handling meat, I don’t say anything, but I always am aware of that.
It’s something that I’m thinking about, and I still don’t really like it…
This vegetarian’s strength of belief proscribes casual contact because to her any physical
contact is considered contamination and has implications for her self-concept. I asked
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another vegetarian if she would kiss her boyfriend if he didn’t brush his teeth after eating
meat. She replied, “If it’s been a couple hours, yeah. (laughs) But, if it’s only been a
half hour and they still taste like meat—nope!” This constant awareness of the presence
of meat even outside eating situations indicates the importance of the vegetarian identity.

Identity Support
Experiences of social support, or lack thereof, may serve to reinforce the
experience of vegetarianism as an identity. Arguably, both social support and a lack of
social support can make the identity more salient. Vegetarians experience varying levels
of social support from family, friends, and society at large for their respective identities,
and this can affect their strength of belief and behavior. Support from family can be
strong, as seen in a couple of vegetarians’ stories. One mentions a vegetarian friend
whose “relatives turned full vegan very late in their lives because their daughter became
an animal rights activist.” Experiences within an in-group may reinforce the identity by
allowing the vegetarian to connect with others.
Many more times, however, vegetarians report receiving too little support from
their family. Instead, they report experiencing ridicule, if not outright sabotage.
My mom was constantly asking, (in a sarcastic voice) “Oh, are you going
to become vegetarian now like everyone around you?” that kind of stuff
[…] After I broke vegetarianism at Thanksgiving, I kept not telling my
mom about it, because I think she’d gloat. Like, “Oh, crawling back
aren’t you?” She wouldn’t do that [gloat], I just know she’d be happy, and
it would almost be like a losing battle.
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This vegetarian experiences her mother’s sarcasm as a strong lack of social support and a
devaluation of her motives. This lack of social support leads to expectations of future
negative interactions, leading to this vegetarian’s decision to hide her inconsistent
behavior in order to avoid confrontation and protect herself from the “battle.”
Additionally, the term “battle” reflects the way this vegetarian sees herself as different
from and oppositional to her mother. Her identity is clarified by contrast to her mother.
In some situations vegetarians may decide to eat meat when they lack support for
vegetarian eating behavior. Moreover, a vegetarian identity is but one of many that a
person possesses, and some identities are more salient than others at given times (Stryker
and Serpe 1994). For some vegetarians, familial identities are prioritized over “dietary”
identities. While vegetarians often defend the boundaries of their identity in public, they
must choose to defend this identity or give it up to some extent in order to preserve their
family connection:
I try to work out a compromise with mom, that if she’s going to cook
something where she puts lots of time and effort […] mom would feel
upset and rejected, because part of how she expresses her love is through
her cooking.
This vegetarian tells a story about a perceived family reaction to maintaining vegetarian
boundaries. From my data, parents and other relatives (in almost every case I have
coded, the mother or aunt) tend to be among the most supportive and least supportive
people a vegetarian may interact with. Some mothers rally around it while others refuse
to accommodate a vegetarian diet, “forcing” the child to make a choice between family
identity and vegetarian identity. The woman telling this story demonstrates a family
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identity that is just as important as her vegetarian identity, if not more so. The social and
personal costs of choosing the vegetarian identity over the familial identity are reflected
in the perceived effect of this woman’s decision on her ties to significant others (Stryker
and Serpe 1994).

This interpretation of costs makes her familial identity more

situationally salient than her vegetarian identity. Meat-eaters also profess an awareness
of these competing identities, telling stories about friends who go home to see their
parents and choose to eat meat at home because “she doesn’t want to offend them. […]
she doesn’t want to lose her family connection.”
Experiencing a lack of social support is also common in more public spheres.
One vegetarian recalls:
I go to a restaurant, and there might not be anything on the menu that is
vegetarian at all […] Sometimes I’m concerned about, if I tell them I’m
vegetarian and don’t want meat, if they’re really conscious of that or not
and be like “oh, ok, well, we’ll make sure we make this separately” or if
they’re just like, “oh, ok,” and they’ll scrape it from one plate to another.
This vegetarian, as all others, experiences a lack of identity support in restaurants and is
reminded that she is different by the restaurant menu. She connects the lack of menu
items to a lack of consciousness about vegetarian dietary options to a lack of care on the
part of the server in providing her with food that meets her vegetarian requirements. This
situation can lead to feelings of concern and distrust. Other vegetarians talk of how these
unsupportive situations remind them of their minority status, where “like any other
minority, you’re subject to abuses, flack.”
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Not all meat-eaters, however, are socially unsupportive.

In the course of

experiences with vegetarian friends, some meat-eaters increase their levels of social
support for vegetarians. One meat-eater talks about a friend who:
didn’t want any kind of exposure to meat whatsoever, and I completely
understand that. To someone like me that might not seem like a big deal.
It might be like “hey buddy, you’re getting your sandwich, why do you
care if it’s the same knife that cut up a big slab of roast beef.” […] So it
was just interesting to hear that, and from then on I was always careful to
separate any vegetarian things at work, very important not to contaminate
it with meat.
This meat-eater illuminates the perspectives of meat-eaters in a system that does not
provide much social support for vegetarians. He shows how meat-eaters often do not
attach the meanings to meat and contact that vegetarians do, experiencing contact as “not
a big deal.” Only by learning the meanings vegetarians attach to those situations are
meat-eaters able to interpret food preparation techniques as a “big deal.” This account
also shows how interactions between meat-eaters and vegetarians affect and spread these
understandings of what it means to be vegetarian. This is but one example of the ways
that meat-eaters play important roles in vegetarian identities; roles that help construct the
very experiences that vegetarians use to define themselves and their social position.

Boundary Work
Accounts show that people experience variations in labels, meanings, and
contents of eating boundaries. They show variations in the importance of vegetarian
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identities and engage in boundary crossing, providing reasons for these transgressions.
Despite all of these findings, many vegetarians believe the vegetarian identity is
important and do a lot of work to symbolically defend its boundaries.
Some vegetarians say that being vegetarian is not important to them. Moreover,
some vegetarians and meat-eaters state that different definitions or behaviors are “no big
deal.” Despite these statements, many of the same people also tell stories that illustrate
boundary work. Though vegetarians and meat-eaters are often unaware that they are
engaging in boundary work, they use vegetarian ideals and moral hierarchies to inform
their interactions with others, resulting in moments of boundary defense.
Many vegetarians feel there are important reasons to reject the claims of others
who call themselves vegetarian. One reason vegetarians engage in boundary work may
be because they define the behavior as avoidable. One vegetarian tells:
[He] said he was vegetarian but, there was this Chinese place that would
make things vegetarian […] he would order chicken fried rice and he
wouldn’t eat the chicken, but he’d eat the fried rice and I’m like, “do you
realize it’s all cooked together and you’re vegetarian?” He’s like, “but I
don’t eat the chicken.”

I’m like, “but there’s chicken juice all over

everything.” And then it got to the point where he would eat the chicken
too, and he was like, “well, it’s only a little bit of chicken, I’m still
vegetarian,” and he was absolutely full of shit, like, I-want-to-punch-himin-the-face full of shit.
This woman notes that the restaurant sells a vegetarian version of the food, suggesting
that her companion’s behavior was avoidable and therefore unacceptable. Vegetarian
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beliefs can lead to strong emotional responses to the perceived lack of boundary strength
among others.

In this case, the vegetarian felt violent emotions toward her companion

and negatively evaluated his attitudes and behavior, which she defined as inconsistent
with that of the ideal vegetarian. Willfully ordering “contaminated food,” and later
eating the chicken itself, does not fit the vegetarian ideal of not consuming animal flesh.
Other vegetarians reason that the behavior of people who eat meat and call
themselves vegetarian harms the vegetarian collective. Making the assumption that the
boundaries are agreed upon and known, one vegetarian maintains that people should not
claim certain vegetarian labels if they do not stay within those boundaries:
Vegans who cheat know that they shouldn’t be eating non-vegan food.
[…] If it’s really that important to them that they have to eat meat or dairy
or whatever, they shouldn’t be calling themselves vegan because it just
makes the vegans who don’t cheat look silly or weak. And since we’re
such a minority, weakness is unacceptable because it undermines the goals
and beliefs of the group.
Rejecting the claims of vegans who eat “meat or dairy or whatever,” this vegetarian
believes individuals’ behaviors reflect on and have a negative effect on the group
(consistent with Hornsey and Jetten 2003). He believes that vegans who cross boundaries
undermine the meanings that have been attached to those boundaries, as well as the moral
distinction those boundaries represent. He reinforces mental contrasts between cheaters
and the others by the use of the terms “they” and “we” to distance that person from the
collective identity. He mentions that the vegan collective is a minority group, suggesting
that this status creates an increased need for strong boundaries to counteract their
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minority position. This type of rejection is common in social movement groups that
perform boundary work in order to preserve the strength and respectability of their
organization (Gamson 1997). This process may help reinforce the prescribed ideal of the
vegetarian category that says “vegetarians consume no meat, not even sometimes” and
may help keep people who eat chicken from becoming representative of the vegetarian
identity.
Boundary work, however, can reach an extreme that excludes most vegetarians.
According to one vegetarian:
I’ve also had vegetarians, er, vegans before that are like so into their
beliefs […] and they get very mad and defensive about it […] it was like,
“Well if you’re going to eat egg or dairy, which comes from an animal,
why don’t you just eat the whole animal, because it’s the same thing.
You’re causing the same amount of problems.”
In this story, some vegans may do boundary work by reasoning that eating dairy or eggs
cause the same amount of problems as eating meat. Therefore non-vegans are rejected.
The vegetarian telling the story depicts a vegan who links vegetarianism to animal rights,
a social problem relationship that provides the cognitive rationale to lump dairy, eggs,
and meat together. Zerubavel (1991) notes that while the fuzzy mind allows for shades of
gray and blurring between boundaries, the rigid mind attempts to maintain purity of
categories, and many vegetarians experience social interactions with other vegetarians
that take on this rigid character. Additionally, the distinction between vegetarian and
vegan labels is presented as important here, as this participant corrects herself about the
category of people to whom she is referring. Her word choice suggests that vegans are
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more likely than vegetarians to adopt intense beliefs and emotional attitudes toward
dietary boundaries, reflecting the heightened importance it holds for them.
Vegetarians are not the only ones who try to regulate eating boundaries. Though
this experience seems counterintuitive at first, meat-eaters’ demonstrations of boundary
work provide an intriguing look into the understandings of meat-eaters who interact with
vegetarians. One meat-eater states:
I think if they’re going to be so proud of being a vegetarian, I think it
totally goes against it, just to even occasionally go against it. […] it really
rubs me the wrong way when you claim to be something and do another
regardless of the circumstances.
This meat-eater believes people who occasionally eat meat should not claim a vegetarian
identity; they do not deserve the pride that goes with their identity. Ironically, though
some other meat-eaters do not feel the need to reject vegetarian claims, meat-eaters like
the one above can effectually guard the “purity” of the beliefs and values of the
vegetarian collective, protecting its moral stance. These meat-eaters do boundary work
for identities of which they are not a member, identities that place meat-eaters in a lower
position within the moral hierarchy. Though they may intend to prevent people from
claiming a morally superior position to them, they subtly protect the moral position that
places them below it.
Other meat-eaters similarly claim that if they saw a vegetarian eating fish or some
other animal, they would directly tell the person, “No, you are not a vegetarian.” One
meat-eater states:
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Technically, fish have meat on them, right? The way I define meat is sort
of like if it’s an animal, and it has muscles and tissues and stuff, that’s
meat. So I’d probably call someone out on not being a vegetarian [for
eating fish] […] I’d ask like, “What’s the difference between a cow and a
fish then? Is a fish less important and less of an animal?”
This meat-eater does boundary work to protect certain social definitions of what
constitutes meat. Like the other meat-eater’s account, even though this man is a meateater, he believes it is important to make vegetarian boundaries clear by defending the
boundaries of definitions of “meat.” Varying conceptions of meat play into the stories
vegetarians tell about being frequently offered chicken, fish, or lamb as an “alternative”
to meat, and this meat-eater protects boundaries in a way that may actually make
vegetarians’ interactions in the social world less problematic.
Despite the fuzziness of vegetarian identity boundaries, both vegetarians and
meat-eaters engage in boundary work. They use socially constructed ideals, definitions,
and moral hierarchies to provide rationales for rejecting certain individuals’ claims to
vegetarianism, working to help clarify boundaries and protect the identities of vegetarian
collectives.

39

CONCLUSIONS
The demographics reported in previous research (Worsley and Skrzypiec 1998)
suggest that women are more likely to be vegetarian than men. Yet participants in this
present study usually report that there is no gender difference in who becomes vegetarian.
It may be fruitful to investigate whether this perception is common, and if so, why there
is such a strong difference between demographics and perception. Additionally, due to
the fact that most of the vegetarians I interviewed are female, do these findings reflect a
more feminine understanding and interaction regarding identity construction and
boundary maintenance? A comparison of the ways men and women variously engage in
these processes may reveal differences.
The demographics of this study’s sample also exclude those racial and ethnic
groups other than Anglo. While these patterns may be the result of the snowballing
technique or the small sample size, more research is needed to better understand the
demographic patterns within vegetarianism. Future research could also investigate how
ethnic or racial differences might affect the ideals, moral hierarchies, importance, and
processes in regards to both vegetarian and meat-eating identities.
This sample also may not pull from the population of those not experiencing
vegetarianism as an important identity, and people without important vegetarian identities
arguably do not spend much time negotiating the boundaries of that identity. But is this
true? Vegetarians in my study were often unaware of their identity negotiations (indeed
awareness of the identity is not a necessary criterion for salience), so perhaps other
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vegetarians do not fail to negotiate boundaries, but rather do so in nuanced ways of which
we are unaware.
Despite these limitations, this work can inform understandings of how vegetarians
negotiate boundaries and experience identity. Throughout this study vegetarians and
meat-eaters are shown engaging in identity work.

Vegetarians and meat-eaters’

interactions involve cognitive processing, self-presentations, and negotiations that are not
as oppositional as stereotypical social ideas suggest. Meat-eaters play an active role
throughout many of these vegetarian identity construction processes and provide a more
balanced picture of them. Meat-eaters at times engage with vegetarians in the issues of
vegetarian ideals, moral hierarchies, identity importance, social support, and boundary
work. Previous vegetarian literature has ignored many of the similarities in vegetarian
and meat-eating experiences in favor of highlighting the oppositional “nature” of these
identities. Social researchers have often focused on pinning down the differences in
values and attitudes between the two groups, in effect, reifying stereotypical cognitive
conceptions of vegetarians and meat-eaters.
While the nature and size of the sample prohibit claims of representativeness,
these accounts show that meat-eaters and vegetarians can experience similar feelings and
attitudes toward animals and meat consumption.

What is more important about

vegetarians and meat-eaters: that they possess some socially marked differences or that
they can often share similar experiences and feelings regarding identity claims,
interactions, and boundary maintenance? Perhaps these shared meanings, ideals, and
moral understandings are reflected in the increasing numbers of vegetarians each year
(Stiles 1998).
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The data also highlight the marked and unmarked characters of many social
identities. In line with Brekhus (1998), normative positions in society are often treated as
unmarked categories; indeed, they are not even experienced as identities. Conversely,
minority group members of all kinds experience marked identities.

In this study,

vegetarians’ non-normative positions in society mean that they will constantly be
reminded of their difference. Their interactions will encourage them to experience their
behavior as a salient and important identity even if outside of social situations they do not
perceive the identity as a “big deal.”
The unmarked character of meat-eating becomes obvious through the very
process of interviewing, when I found that sensible questions to vegetarians do not make
sense to meat-eaters. It often took a great deal of time for meat-eaters to label themselves
in interviews. The meat-eaters tended to say things like, “I’m just a normal eater.” Part
way through the interview they would adopt the term “omnivore” or “meat-eater” in
order to compare themselves to vegetarians. The unmarked character of the meat-eating
identity was also displayed through their stories of how being a meat-eater never came up
in their lives except when interacting with vegetarians.

If these meat-eaters have

vegetarian friends within their social circle and still experience their dietary category as
unmarked, how much more unmarked do meat-eaters without vegetarian friends
experience their dietary category? It is important to note, however, that when a member
of an unmarked category suddenly becomes marked, that marking can be much more
salient for the unmarked person who is not used to being in that situation.
The data show that vegetarians and meat-eaters engaged in processes of lumping
and splitting in ways that clustered many variations into a small number of bounded
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categories (Zerubavel 1991). Despite the variation in the very processes themselves (and
despite the fact that there is likely even more variation outside this sample), people orient
toward specific vegetarian ideals that are used to guide the construction of a socially
meaningful identity. While my research focused on vegetarian identities, these findings
may be used to better understand other identities whose classifications resist universal
acceptance such as transgender identities and Christian identities. The data show that
people are able to develop and maintain coherent social ideals within ambiguous and
contested categories. These ideals become resources that social actors can use to inform
expectations, moral meanings, and boundary maintenance processes, clarifying the
identity in question.
When studying the meanings and boundaries of identities, an inclusion of labeled
“out-group” discourse may reveal surprising interactions and engagement with “ingroup” identities. Boundary construction and maintenance is shown to be an interactive
process involving individuals outside the studied group. Just as vegetarians defend the
boundaries of their identity, meat-eaters reject certain people’s claims to vegetarianism.
Though meat-eaters may engage in boundary work for different reasons than vegetarians,
meat-eaters protect the purity of the vegetarian identity even though that identity
positions meat-eaters as “morally inferior.” These findings may parallel other identities
that claim positive moral dimensions and provide a mandate to examine other morallyimbued identities, such as religious groups and groups of social activists. Is it a common
activity for outsiders to monitor identity construction when the moral identities of other
groups implicitly construct the outsider’s own moral identity? Additionally, how may
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outsiders reconcile their boundary work behavior with its potential effect of reinforcing
the position of the outsider as morally inferior?
Vegetarianism is a voluntary (as opposed to ascribed) identity where boundary
work is a continual concern. Because of this character, voluntary identities may often
coincide with identities whose classifications resist universal acceptance. Studies of how
members of voluntary identities such as social movement identities (Gamson 1997) and
members of other organizational identities engage in this ongoing boundary negotiation
can provide a useful insight into ways these identities locate and use social ideals as
resources to inform identity boundaries.
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